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FUNCTIONINGS AND CAPABILITIES

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by

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References
1. The Capabilities Approach: An Introduction

Traditional welfare economics tends to identify a person’s well-being with the person’s command over goods and services. This naturally leads to a focus on income, since a person’s income determines how much he or she can consume. Going a step further, this approach often thinks of each person as being endowed with a ‘utility or welfare function’, and the person’s income as an important variable that determines the level of utility that the person enjoys. Social welfare, according to this approach, is represented by aggregating the utility levels of all individuals in society.

An alternative route to this beaten track is the “capabilities approach”, which replaces the traditional concern for commodities and utility with, respectively, functionings and capability. While the origins of the capabilities approach go back to John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith and, in fact, to Aristotle, it is only over the last one or two decades--after these early suggestions were resurrected, reinterpreted and partially formalized by Amartya Sen (1980, 1985)--that the capabilities approach gained some currency within the economics profession, culminating in the heroic effort undertaken by the annual Human Development Reports, which try to make some of these ideas operational.

While the capabilities approach now has a substantial literature, discussing and debating the ideas, exploring variants and applying them to evaluating the standard of living of different nations or regions, the crux of its discord with traditional welfare economics is to be found in the distinction between ‘goods’ and ‘functionings’ and also between achievement and freedom. A functioning is what a person manages to do or to be. A good can enable a functioning but is distinct from it. A bicycle is a
good, whereas being able to transport oneself rapidly to work (or, more importantly to most people, away from work) is a functioning. Two persons, each owning a bicycle, may not be able to achieve the same functioning. If, for instance, one of them happens to be handicapped, she may not be able to use the bike to go as far as the other person can. This is one of the central operational distinctions between commodities and functionings. Whereas we need not know anything about the individual concerned in asserting that he owns a certain good (for instance, a bike), we may need to know a good deal about a person, over and above what commodities he owns, in order to know what functionings he can achieve.

Just as a functioning must not be confused with a commodity, which may well play an enabling role, a functioning must not be confused with utility. It is possible to develop the capabilities approach without reference to utility, but it is not incompatible with the idea of human beings striving to achieve a certain level of or even aiming to maximize utility. If we were to use the idea of utility in conjunction with functionings, then it is important to recognize that functionings are prior to utility. Just as commodities make it possible to achieve certain functionings, functionings may enable a person to reach certain levels of utility.

However, the functionings achieved by a person may not be sufficient in determining a person’s overall quality of life or well-being. For the latter we need to know, minimally, the person’s ‘capability’, the functionings that the person could have achieved. Hence, capability is closely related to the idea of opportunity, freedom, and advantage. According to the capabilities approach, in determining the overall quality of life of a person, it is not enough to know what functionings he achieved, for instance, that he did not go to Florida and, instead, remained in Poland. We need to know, if he could have gone to
Florida and chose not to, or he did not have the money to go to Florida, or was denied a visa to get to the U.S.

It should be clear that it is not just a comparison of capabilities that we need to undertake but also the choice that a person made. So, at the minimum what we need to know about each person is a set and a singleton--the set from which she was free and able to choose and the singleton that she actually achieved (see Suzumura and Xu, 1999). At times we may for simplicity focus on the achieved functionings alone or the capabilities set alone without information on what functionings were achieved, but given free information, we would ideally want information on both in assessing a person’s or a society’s quality of life.

Another thing that must be evident is, as Sen (1994) has stressed, that the capabilities approach suffers from the embarrassment of riches because in life the functionings that we may or may not achieve are manifold. This approach recognizes that real society is peopled with characters whose entire quality of life cannot fully be captured by a unique real number, characters who have distinct notions of well-being, happiness, and desire-fulfilment. One consequence of this is that the idea of capability is not fully formalized and perhaps not even fully formalizable. How easily a concept yields to formalization is often treated by economists as an index of the concept’s usefulness. To take such a view would however be erroneous. There are many important ideas or concepts, for example, utility, liberty or happiness, which may be impossible to capture fully in a single formalization but nevertheless be useful. That is the view we take of capability here. One consequence of taking such a view is that, in trying to empirically compare the quality of life achieved by different societies using the capabilities approach, we may need
to focus on a few salient functionings (risking the charge of idiosyncracy). Do people in society x have the option of a long and healthy life? Are people able to live lives free of political oppression? Are people able to read and write and therefore enjoy literature and communication with others? Do people have enough to eat and drink? Of course, empirically one has to face tricky questions like whether one should provide the information on achieved functionings as a vector or aggregate them into a single number (see Ray, 1998, for discussion). But the dilemma should not be used as reason not to do either.

2. The Ideas in History

The origin of the idea of functionings and capability can be traced back to Aristotle. The two fundamental observations related to this concept take place in his discussion on political distribution in *Politics* (Book VII, chapters 1-2) and the concept of the “good” and the “good man” in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book I, Chapter 7). The Aristotelian foundation has been discussed at length by Nussbaum (1988, 1992) and Cohen (1993). In *Politics* (mainly VII. 1-2), when discussing the idea of the “best political arrangement”, Aristotle argues that the aim of political planning is the distribution of the conditions for a good life to the people in the city. These conditions are understood by him as producing capabilities, that is, the possibilities of having a “flourishing life”. It is not the allotment of commodities that we should be concerned about, but the possibility to function in a certain human way, as explained in the interpretation by Nussbaum (1988).\(^1\) When we ask concretely what he meant by the idea of “functioning in certain human ways”, it is useful to look at his argument on “human functioning” in
the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which we shall discuss presently. These two references are the core that establish the Aristotelian foundation of Sen’s criticism of utilitarianism and of the Rawlsian ethics in his *Tanner Lectures* (Sen, 1980).

Aristotle has a famous argument on human functioning in his discussion of ‘the good human life.’² While admitting that most human beings live their lives in the pursuit of happiness, he argues against a purely hedonistic view of life and proposes a different definition of the good human life. This definition emphasizes the rational nature of human beings, as the specific difference that makes them distinct from animals. Aristotle tells us that “now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish of their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts.”³ In this way, he would argue later that a good human life would not only require adequate functioning in terms of “nutrition and growth”, a purely animal feature, but the possibility of exercising choice and practical reason. A purely hedonistic life, as well as one devoted to contemplation or to the accumulation of wealth, are rejected as definitions of a “good human life.”⁴

He establishes thus that a good life is one in which a person can function not only in the biological sense, but by exercising choice and reason. On the other hand, “it is evident that the best political arrangement is that according to which anyone whatsoever might do best and live a flourishing life (*zoie makarios*”) (Politics, VII.2). The fact that “anyone whatsoever might do best” gives us the egalitarian perspective, but egalitarian in the realm of capabilities, as possibilities to function as human beings. This involves biological functions, as well as possibilities to exercise reason and actively participate in the political life.⁵ This perspective is called the “Distributive Conception” in Nussbaum
More than twenty centuries later, Marx (1844) and Marx and Engels (1845-46) proposed a view of human functioning and effective freedom that can be interpreted from an Aristotelian perspective. Marx described a commendable human life as not only one in which the person’s material needs are satisfied (biological functioning), but also as one in which the human being is able to use reason. He makes a strong case for differentiating activities that are purely animal from those which distinguish men and women as human beings. When discussing the meaning of "alienation of labor", Marx says that "man (the worker) feels that he is acting freely only in his animal functions--eating, drinking, and procreating, or at most in his dwelling and adornment--while in his human functions, he is nothing more than animal" (Marx, 1944). For Marx, the biological needs of eating, drinking, or procreation, are "genuinely human functions", but without freedom of choice and freedom from immediate want, these will be performed in a merely animal way.\(^6\)

Not only was Marx using the concept of "human functions," but Marx and Engels (1945-6) also discussed the idea of effective freedom in a way that we can relate to the concept of functionings and capabilities. The real liberation of human beings is discussed as being related to economic progress and the strengthening of real capabilities. Thus they tell us:

"...That real liberation is not possible outside the real world and through real means, that it is not possible to abolish slavery without the steam machine the mule jenny, that it is not possible to abolish a regime of serfdom without an improved agriculture, that, in general, it is not possible to free men if they cannot be assured access to food, drink, housing, and good quality-clothing."

But they also add that the liberated society would
“..make it possible for me to do one thing to-day and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic” (p. 22).

These statements also show a view of freedom in the sense of what individuals, everything considered, are indeed able to do, as opposed to what they are formally prevented from doing. This introduces the discussion of what shall be called “actual freedom,” as opposed to “formal freedom,” the latter being consistent with the view of the classical liberals. T. H. Green, foreshadowing the famous later work of Isiah Berlin, wrote on this topic emphasizing the distinction between freedom in the sense of not being prevented from doing something, and the actual ability to do something. Green (1900) tells us that:

"We shall probably all agree that freedom, rightly understood, is the greatest of blessings; that its attainment is the true end of all our efforts as citizens. But when we thus speak of freedom, we should consider carefully what we mean by it. We do not mean merely freedom from restraint or compulsion...When we speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others" (p. 371).

Development of better living conditions seems to be related to that positive capacity of doing things, as in Aristotle's and Marx's writings. Green says that "in a sense no man is so well able to do as he likes as the wandering savage... He has no master...Yet, we do not count him really free, because the freedom of the savage is not strength, but weakness" (p. 371). One sees in this echoes of Berlin's (1969) ideas of "positive freedom" and "negative freedom", the latter being as understood by the
classical liberals. Berlin says:

“The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty..., which (following much precedent) I shall call the “negative” sense, is involved in the answer to the question “what is the area within which the subject - -a person or group of persons-- is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons’’. The second, which I shall call the “positive” sense, is involved in the answer to the question “what or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?”. The two questions are clearly different, even though the answers to them may overlap” (p. 122).

The fact that the goods are required to satisfy the need to function biologically and socially, as well as to be able to exercise reason and choice, is at the core of the capability approach (see, for instance, Roemer, 1996, and Herrero, 1996). This idea is also related to Smith (1776). Smith discusses the notion that commodities give individuals not only consumption possibilities, but the ability to interact socially as well. This is the way in which Smith (1776) defines “necessaries”:

“By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, strictly speaking, is not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I supposed, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty...” (p.p. 870-871).

When Malinowsky (1921), describing the primitive economy of the Trobriand Islanders, off the coast of New Guinea, notes that "to the natives the possession and display of food are of immense value
and importance *in themselves*" (p. 8, own italics), he is referring to the same idea of goods being used to give social dignity. "One of the greatest insults," writes Malinowsky, "that can be uttered is to call someone 'man with no food,' and it would be bitterly resented and probably a quarrel would ensue. To be able to boast of having food, is one of their chief glories and ambitions" (p. 8).

This perspective is an example of the instrumental nature of commodities acquisition, as a means to achieve certain human functionings that include social interaction, dignity, and the participation in the life of the community. Sen (1983a) would discuss later, based on Smith’s definition, the concept of poverty as being *relative* in the realm of commodities but *absolute* in the realm of capabilities.

The foundations of Sen's new perspective on well-being are thus Aristotle’s concept of the “good life” and the “goodness” of a political arrangement, as well as Marx’s view of a true human life and real liberation. Moreover, those ideas are enriched by Smith’s definition of necessary goods and by T. H. Green's and Berlin’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” freedom.

3. Sen’s Critique and Formulation

Even though the concept of capabilities is related to the subject of human well-being in general, its contemporary treatment originated in Sen's Tanner lectures at Stanford University in 1979 which was focused on alternative interpretations of egalitarianism. Starting with a critique of utilitarianism and Rawlsianism, Sen went on to develop the idea of “functioning” and proposed “capability” as a new answer to the question: Equality of What? (Sen, 1980). In a series of subsequent papers (Sen, 1985,
1987, 1990, 1992, 1993) he developed these ideas further and tried to establish capabilities as a general approach to evaluating human condition.

Chronological fidelity is not always desirable when surveying a field of study, but in this case it is useful to start with Sen’s Tanner lectures. In these lectures, Sen began with an evaluation of utilitarianism as a moral principle. Utilitarianism requires that given a choice from among several alternatives, we select the one that maximizes the sum total of utility among all human beings. This, combined with the standard assumption that marginal utility from income for each person diminishes as a person has more income, implies that under utilitarianism when a fixed income is being distributed among a set of individuals, this will be done so that each person gets the same marginal utility. Hence, to the question “Equality of What?,” the utilitarian answer is: “marginal utility”. Sen then goes on to remind us that this may be fine when the human beings in question happen to be similar but comes apart once we recognize the essential diversity of human beings.

Sen criticizes utilitarianism both by appealing to more general moral principles which conflict with it (the “prior-principle critique”) and constructing examples of special cases which check our “moral intuition” (the “case-implication critique”).

To take first the case-implication critique, he considers the example of a handicapped person who has great need for money and another person who has no handicaps but is a pleasure machine who derives a lot of satisfaction from every dollar that she is able to spend. Plainly, equalizing marginal utility requires giving more money to the latter. The needy, in other words, gets less, which does not seem to square up with our moral intuition about equity.
Sen also considers Rawls’ critique that people behind a “veil of ignorance” would not opt for a society that maximizes the sum total of utility, opting instead for a more equitable distribution of utility. In the spirit of prior-principle critique, Rawls also emphasized how utilitarianism does injustice to some of our basic notions of liberty and equality.

Rawls proposed a principle in which society is evaluated in terms of the level achieved by the worst off person in society, measured over an index of primary goods --the so-called “maximin” principle. Economists usually attribute to him a different principle that follows the same criterion, but measures the level over the dimension of utility. But as Sen points out, this and also the closely related “leximin,” goes to the other extreme of utilitarianism in ignoring claims arising from the intensity of one’s needs.

Utilitarianism and Rawls' criterion as interpreted by economists belong to the more general category of “welfarism”. Welfarism, which in turn is a special case of consequentialism, is the view that the goodness of a society can be judged entirely from information on the utility levels achieved by every human being in that society (see Sen, 1977; Scanlon, 2001). The most important prior-principle critique that Sen mounts against utilitarianism is to argue that, in evaluating a society or state of affairs fully, we must make room for non-utility information.

The critique does not apply to the moral criterion that Rawls had originally developed. Rawls (1971) moved away from welfarism by eliminating the emphasis on utilities and proposing a view based on what he called primary goods. Rawls’ criterion would be the first step towards a formal theory in which equality of opportunity becomes the concept of moral importance for distributive justice. The
Rawlsian principle of justice can be summarized by the following mandate: *maximize the minimum, over all persons, of the bundle of primary goods*.\textsuperscript{11} This mandate is called the “difference principle”.

The definition of primary goods is of essential importance for the understanding of Rawls’ theory.

Following Rawls (1971, 1982), we can identify five groups of primary goods:

a) Basic liberties,

b) Freedom of movement and choice of occupation,

c) Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of public responsibility,

d) Income and wealth,

e) The social bases of self-respect.

Rawls proposes that the first two sets are formally prior to the pursuit of the other three. The political setting must first provide the conditions stated in (a) and (b) in order for the economic system to provide the conditions for (c), (d), and (e).

From a prior-principle point of view, Sen argues that the difference principle can be criticized for being concerned with means (commodities), not ends (freedoms). Indeed, it has some tendency to be “primary good fetishist” in analogy with Marx’s (1844) discussion of “commodity fetishism”. Moreover, by applying the case-implication critique we would find that the difference principle could be unacceptably indifferent to heterogeneity.

Consider the case of a handicapped person who has a marginal utility disadvantage.--He is not very efficient at converting dollars into utils at the margin. In addition, suppose that he is no worse off than others in utility terms despite his handicap, perhaps because he has an innately jolly disposition, or
because of a deep religiosity. It is now evident that neither utilitarianism nor the leximin criterion will do much for him. Indeed, he seems to be beyond the reach of virtually all reasonable welfarist principles. What about authentic Rawlsianism, based on deprivation in terms of primary goods? Unfortunately that too is handicapped by its concern for goods, even though “goods” are defined in a fairly broad way.

Roemer (1996) has also criticized Rawls, though on different grounds. This criticism relates to the fact that the difference principle does not consider people’s evaluation of their state. He shows that Rawls’ notion of primary goods "must depend on the conceptions of the good that individuals have, though it cannot be recovered solely by knowing those conceptions" (Roemer, 1996, p.169). The conceptions of the good by individuals are related to their “life plans”, in Rawls’ terminology, so utility would be interpreted in that sense as “satisfaction” or “desire-fulfilment”.\textsuperscript{12} The relevance of responsibility --deciding on one’s life plan-- would become the feature analyzed in later discussions on inequality.\textsuperscript{13} This point relates to one of the most important features of Rawls' and Sen's theory, namely the emphasis that is put on \textit{ex ante} opportunity, as opposed to \textit{ex post} outcomes. The typical utilitarian solution is clearly based on the latter.

Another feature of Rawls’ theory consists of using the “veil of ignorance” argument to claim that individuals behind that “veil” would choose the Maximin principle over an index of primary goods as the accepted social contract.\textsuperscript{14} By constructing a formalization of this statement, Roemer (1996, ch. 5) has tried to show that the argument is flawed. Using von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions for the souls behind the “veil of ignorance” choosing a social contract --a tax scheme that redistributes resources according to the Maximin principle-- , it is shown that Maximin would not be chosen by the
agents, unless they are infinitely risk-averse.\textsuperscript{15}

Summarizing, Rawls defends the difference principle from two perspectives: first, by claiming its “impartiality” (justice as fairness), and second, by appealing to “mutual advantage” (choosing social contract from behind the “veil of ignorance”). Both arguments are criticized by Sen (1980, 1993) and Roemer (1996). Those Rawlsian ideas, however, set the basic notion of justice as equality of \textit{ex ante} opportunity, as opposed to the emphasis on outcomes embedded in the welfaristic theories of justice.\textsuperscript{16}

What we need, so argues Sen, is a moral system that is concerned not just with “good things”, but “with what these good things do to human beings, . . . . I believe what is at issue is the interpretation of needs in the form of basic capabilities. The interpretation of needs and interests is often implicit in the demand for equality. This type of equality I shall call basic capability equality” (Sen, 1979). Thus, through this discussion of equality, the idea of capability and, implicitly, functioning was conceived.

The formalizations of this approach occurred later. One of the first efforts was by Sen (1985), who tried to give structure to the perspective of well-being based on the concepts of functionings and capabilities. Goods have an instrumental value in that they allow individuals to “function”. A functioning is an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or to be. Formally, we start from the commodities vector. Let us use $x_i$ to denote the vector of commodities possessed by person $i$.

Following Gorman (1968) and Lancaster (1966), Sen used the fact that commodities can be converted into characteristics. Thus if $c$ is the function converting a commodity vector into a vector of characteristics, the vector of characteristics consumed by person $i$ will be given by $c(x_i)$.\textsuperscript{17} Next, let $f_i$ be person $i$’s “personal utilization function,” that is, a function that converts characteristics into functionings.
Given that in this exercise c is exogenous to the person, we could actually think of f, as a function, which directly converts commodity vectors into functionings. But let us for now continue with Sen’s treatment. In Sen’s model f, is partly a matter of person i’s choice. She chooses a utilization function from a feasible set, F, of utilization functions.

A functioning is a function that tells us what person i has achieved (a being) given her choice of a utilization function fi ∈ F. We represent it as

\[ b_i = f_i(c(x_i)) \]

The vector bi represents the beings that a person has managed to accomplish by using the commodities she possesses and choosing an utilization function from Fi. Those functionings are, for example, being well-nourished, well-clothed, mobile, and participating actively in the life of the community. In the Aristotelian view, these would imply “functioning in a human way”.

Next, define Pi(xi) as the set of functioning vectors feasible for person i, as

\[ P_i(x_i) = \{ b_i | b_i = f_i(c(x_i)), \text{ for some } f_i \in F_i \} \]

Let us suppose the person i has access to any of the set of vectors of commodities in Xi. Then Xi is her entitlements. Now, we can define the effective “freedom” that a person has, given her command over commodities and her individual possibilities of converting the characteristics of goods into functionings. Such a set represents person i’s capabilities. Formally, person i’s capability is given by:

\[ Q_i = \{ b_i | b_i = f_i(c(x_i)), \text{ for some } f_i \in F_i, \text{ and some } x_i \in X_i \} \]

This sums up Sen’s own formalization of one way of going from commodities, via functionings,
to capability.

4. Further Formalizations

Roemer (1996) noted that the approach proposed by Sen has four similarities with Rawls’: (a) both are non-welfarist, (b) both are egalitarian, (c) both emphasize *ex-ante* opportunity, as opposed to *ex-post* outcome evaluation, and (d) they both take a concept of freedom from the perspective of actual possibility to achieve, as opposed to formal liberty that considers only legal barriers to individual action. Utilitarianism is non-egalitarian and emphasizes outcomes. On the other hand, from characteristics (c) and (d) we can see the relevance these theories assign to individual responsibility.

Dworkin (1981) has suggested an approach that assigns a higher importance to individual responsibility, thus advocating “equality of resources”. That would eliminate the “paternalistic” bias in the capabilities view and would force individuals to be responsible for their life plans. The importance of the individual life plans and responsibility had already been discussed in Rawls (1971). “Agency achievement” is the term used by Sen when discussing the satisfaction of those individual plans (Foster and Sen, 1997). Roemer (1986) has shown that, under a specific interpretation of what resources are, equality of resources and equality of welfare cannot be distinguished, which would put Dworkin’s idea within the realm of the welfaristic perspective.

The concept of a functioning represents the *state of* a person, a set of things that she manages to do or to be in her life. The capabilities reflect the alternative combination of functionings that a person
can achieve, from which the individual will choose one collection. If, say, there are \( n \) relevant functionings, then that person’s level of achievement will be represented by an \( n \)-tuple. Well-being will be defined as the *quality* of a person’s being, based on those functionings the person can indeed choose from. How many and what specific functionings should be included in evaluating a person’s well-being has been a subject of debate. However, as Sen (1992) has claimed, “we may be able to go a fairly long distance with a relatively small number of centrally important functionings and the corresponding basic capabilities” (p. 31) especially when analyzing issues like poverty in developing countries. Those centrally important functionings would include the ability to be well-nourished and well-sheltered, as well as the capability of escaping avoidable morbidity and premature mortality, among some basic ones.

Suppose now that the problem of choosing the relevant functionings is somehow resolved. Given that functionings are vectors, there is a large problem of aggregation that is bound to occur as soon as we try to use this approach for normative purposes. Suppose we decide to follow Rawls and commend the society in which the capability of the least capable person is the highest. How shall we do so? This is exactly the question that Herrero (1996) investigates in an important paper, based on Roemer (1988).

Herrero’s (1996) and Roemer’s (1996) recent exercises in interpreting Rawls’ difference principle in terms of capability sets provides a nice example of one way in which we may proceed to formalize the capability approach. As noted in the previous section, economists’ using Rawls’ principle have usually worked with utility as the indicator of individual well-being. Rawls himself had based much
of his normative analysis on the primary goods consumed by individuals. Herrero moves away from both utility and primary goods, to capabilities. Rawls’ difference principle would then recommend that we maximize the capability of the person having the smallest capability. Since a person’s capability is a set of functionings, it is not always obvious whether one person has a larger capability than another (consider the case where neither’s capability set is a subset of the other’s). Hence, we are immediately confronted with the problem of comparison, which somehow needs to be formalized. Carmen Herrero proceeds to develop her argument axiomatically. In what follows we provide a sketch of her model, while cautioning the reader that there may be other ways to formalize the capabilities approach.

Let us suppose that there are h commodities and $\mathbb{R}^h_+$ is the set of all possible commodity bundles. There are m functionings and $\mathbb{R}^m$ is the set of all possible functionings. For each person i there exists a correspondence $C_i: \mathbb{R}^h_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ such that, for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^h_+$, $C_i(x)$ is the set of all functioning vectors available to person i. In Herrero’s model, $C_i(x)$ is person i’s capability or capability set. Note that, in keeping with the discussion in the previous sections a person’s capability depends not just on the goods he consumes but also on who he happens to be. Hence, the subscript i. In what follows, we use $B(X)$ to denote the set of boundary points of the set $X \subset \mathbb{R}^m$. The following conditions are assumed throughout this exercise:

1. $C_i(0) = \emptyset$
2. If $x > y$, then $C_i(x) \supseteq C_i(y)$, $\forall x, y \in \mathbb{R}^h_+$
3. $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}^h_+$, $C_i(x)$ is such that, $\forall g \in B(C_i(x))$, $[0,g) \subseteq C_i(x) \setminus B(C_i(x))$
4. $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}^h_+$, $C_i(x)$ is compact.
(5) If \( \{x_n\} \) is a sequence such that \( x_n \to x \), \( f_n \in C_i(x_n) \), and \( f_n \to f \), then \( f \in C_i(x) \).

(6) \( \exists x \in \mathbb{R}^h_+ \) such that \( f \in C_i(x) \) and \( f \gg 0 \).

Conditions (1) through (6) are a combination of self-evident axioms and some technical conditions needed for the results to be proven in Herrero’s (1996) setting.

A person’s utility depends both on the goods he consumes and the functionings he achieves. Hence, person i’s utility function, \( v_i \), may be thought of as a function

\[
v_i : \mathbb{R}^h \times \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R}
\]

While Sen does not always assume utility maximizing behavior on the part of agents, we shall here go along with Herrero (1996) and assume that if person i consumes a commodity bundle \( x \), she will choose a functioning vector \( f^* \) such that

\[
v_i(x, f^*) \geq v_i(x, f), \quad \forall f \in C_i(x)
\]

Let us now define

\[
v_i(x) = \max_{f \in C_i(x)} v_i(x, f)
\]

It is interesting to note that this formulation is general enough to allow for the possibility that even if a person’s capability increases, her utility falls. In other words, we can have \( C_i(x) \subset C_i(y) \) but \( v_i(x) > v_i(y) \).

The normative problem in this model is posed in terms of a planner, who has a vector, \( w \), of commodities to be distributed among the n individuals in society. The planner’s aim is the Rawlsian one of maximizing the capability of the individual with the least capability. So she has to confront head on the problem of comparing capability sets. Comparison of sets, when this has to be consistent with some
underlying preference over the elements of the sets, is problematic (see, for example, Kannai and Peleg, 1984; Barberá and Pattanaik, 1984). Herrero circumvents this by thinking of an index of capability sets, which is a primitive.

Individual i’s capability index is a concave and continuous function, $c_i : R^h_+ \rightarrow R$, such that $c_i(0) = 0$, $C_i(x) \subseteq C_i(y)$ implies $c_i(x) \leq c_i(y)$, and $\lim_{t \to \infty} (1/t) c_i(tx) = 0$, $\forall x \in R^h_+$. The interpretation of this is as follows. If $c_i(x) = r$, then person i having a capability set $C_i(x)$ is described as having a capability index of $r$. An increasing capability index suggests greater capability.

A planner’s problem may now be expressed as a quadruple $\sigma = <n, h, w, c>$, where we are describing any distribution problem by the following pieces: number of agents in the economy, $n$; number of commodities, $h$; available resources for distribution, $w \in R^h_+$; and an n-tuple of capability indices, $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_n)$, where $c : R^h_+ \rightarrow R$. Let $\Sigma$ be the collection of all possible planner’s problems. This formulation, mathematically, is the same as the one in Roemer (1988).

Given a planner’s problem $\sigma$, the set of all feasible allocations, $Z(\sigma)$, is defined as follows:

$$Z(\sigma) = \{ (x_1, \ldots, x_n) | \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \leq w \text{ and } x_i \geq 0, \forall i \}$$

We are now in a position to formalize the Rawlsian Solution (with capabilities as fundamentals) of a planner’s problem. Given $r \in R^n$, let $\alpha(r)$ be a permutation of $r$ such that $\alpha_1(r) \leq \alpha_2(r) \leq \ldots \leq \alpha_n(r)$. Given that $r, k \in R^n$, we write $r \succ_L k$ if $\exists i$ such that $r_i > k_i$ and, for all $j < i$, $r_j = k_j$.

The Rawlsian solution of a planner’s problem $\sigma$ is denoted by $L(\sigma)$ and defined as follows:

$$L(\sigma) = \{ z \in Z(\sigma) | [ \alpha(c(y)) \succ_L \alpha(c(z)) \Rightarrow y \notin Z(\sigma) ] \}$$

$L(\sigma)$ is the collection of those feasible allocations which endow the n individuals with capabilities
such that no n-tuple of capabilities exist which is feasible and lexicographically dominates this (that is, dominates in terms of the binary relation \(^\succ\)). Herrero also considers \(L(\sigma)\) as the collection of fair allocations \(a la\ Sen\), since “they provide equal capability indices up to the point at which it does not come into conflict with optimality in capability terms” (Herrero, 1996, p.79).

A logically interesting exercise that is undertaken in Herrero (1996) is to consider mechanisms and desirable axioms (in the spirit of Roemer, 1988, and Nieto, 1992) which turn out to be equivalent to the Rawlsian solution. To convey an idea of this, define an allocation mechanism, \(F\), to be a mapping

\[
F: \Sigma \rightarrow 2^{\sigma(\Sigma)}
\]

Such that \(\forall \sigma \in \Sigma, F(\sigma)\) is non-empty.

The axioms that Herrero imposes on \(F\) are, stated informally, as follows:

(i) If two allocations are indistinguishable in terms of their capability implications, then if the allocation mechanism chooses one of them, it must pick the other;

(ii) The chosen allocations must be Pareto optimal in capabilities (instead of the usual utilities);

(iii) \(F\) must be anonymous over the agents;

(iv) Suppose a certain good, \(k\), is “personal” for agent \(i\) in the sense that the capability set of other agents is independent of their consumption of \(k\). \(F\) should have the property that a change in the planner’s problem which simply eliminates the personal good should leave the allocation unchanged for everybody over the other goods;

(v) If the amount of personal good for agent \(j\) available increases, \(j\)’s capability index should not fall;
(vi) If some agents disappear with the goods allocated to them, the allocation made in the revised planner’s problem should be such that all other agents get exactly what they got before the agent's disappearance.

Herrero proves that F satisfies axioms (i)-(vi) if and only if it is the Rawlsian solution, defined above.

As always, the advantage of an axiomatization is that it allows us to evaluate a large moral principle by breaking it up into parts. To us it seems that axioms (iii) and (vi) are the ones that can be contested. Sen himself has challenged anonymity, though there is less scope for that criticism in this framework since individuals are allowed to have different $C_i$ and $c_i$ functions.

Nevertheless, there may be traits associated with who the person happens to be that anonymity, that is, axiom (iii), tends to ignore. Axiom (vi) suggests a kind of absence of externality, which may well be questioned.

This formal exercise may not fully capture the intuition behind the capabilities approach but it sets up a useful agenda and also helps to potentially break up and evaluate the whole new approach.

Once the allocation is made in a way consistent with the leximin rule in the dimension of capabilities, it is worth investigating what is the result in the dimension of utilities, under the given assumptions. When defining and constructing the set of capability-Pareto optimal allocations, the information regarding utilities is irrelevant. No clear relation can be derived, in principle, between allocations that are capability-Pareto optimal and the set of Pareto optimal allocations in the utility sense.

This link can be established, however, as long as the utilities depend on functionings that are
relevant for the capability index in a specific way.\textsuperscript{18} The specific assumption that Herrero examines is one with the property that \( c_i(x_i) > c_i(y_i) \) implies \( u_i(x_i) > u_i(y_i) \), i.e., a higher capability index implies higher utility.\textsuperscript{19} This assumption can be added to the description of the allocation problem. That specific property of the utility functions is added to the information set. Thus, the problem is characterized by \( \tau = \{ \sigma, \mathbf{u} \} = \{ \langle n, h, w, c \rangle, \mathbf{u} \} \), where \( \sigma \) describes the problem, as before, and \( \mathbf{u} = (u_1, \ldots, u_n) \), \( u_i : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \), \( \forall i = 1, \ldots, n \), and \( c_i(x_i) > c_i(y_i) \Rightarrow u_i(x_i) > u_i(y_i) \).

Under this framework, two important results relating capabilities and utilities can be established. The first one states that when an allocation is chosen from the set of capabilities-Pareto optimal allocations, recontracting among agents aimed at improving well-being cannot result in a suboptimal outcome in capability terms. Moreover, if the positive relationship between comparable capability indices and utilities does exist, the intersection between the set of capabilities-Pareto optimal allocations and \( u \)-Pareto optimal allocations is not empty.

Finally, one more assumption allows us to establish the result that the set of capabilities-Pareto optimal allocation is contained in the set of utility-Pareto optimal allocations in problems of this class. The assumption is "local non-satiation" of the capability indices. Though restrictive, within that setting it is possible to state that choosing an allocation that is optimal in capability terms would also imply that the allocation is optimal in utility terms. Herrero (1996) goes beyond these results to show under what conditions the mechanisms would necessarily result in allocations that are Pareto optimal in capability terms. As explained above, the most important assumption that drives the result of the interaction between capabilities and utilities is that capabilities and utilities move in the same direction.
Other formalizations have emerged from the idea that capability is a fuzzy concept. The idea that deprivation is not an "all-or-nothing" condition lies behind that conception. Instead of assigning a 1 or 0 to elements depending on whether they belong or not to a specific set, it uses a function, called "membership function", which takes values in the closed interval \([0,1]\), corresponding to the degree of membership. Chiappero-Martinetti (1994, 1996) shows the empirical obstacles and possible solutions to the implementation of “fuzzy” measurement of well-being from the capabilities perspective.

Once one enters the domain of the "partial" new avenues of inquiry open up. Basu and Foster (1998), for instance, consider the case of education, where the mere presence of a literate person in the household confers some partial benefits of literacy on the illiterate members of the household. The deprivation of illiteracy in their model is total if a person is an "isolated illiterate," that is, an illiterate who lives in a household with no literate member, and partial if the person is a "proximate illiterate." It may be possible in the future to exploit the algebraic affinity between such a model and Chiappero-Martinetti's (1996) fuzzy approach to gain new insights.

5. Capability, Preference, and Choice

The subject of capability is closely related to that of freedom (see Arrow, 1995; Pettit, 2001). Viewed as a concomitant of freedom it gives rise to some special problems, especially when we consider the choices of several individuals. To get to this in a simple framework, it is best to start with the formulation of Foster and Sen (1997, pp.199-203). They begin by assuming that there are n
different kinds of functionings, a capability set, \( K \), is a subset of \( \mathbb{R}^n \), and a person facing a capability set chooses some point, \( x \), in the capability set. A focus on achievement would require us to focus exclusively on choices. Most traditional evaluations of well-being in economics do precisely that. Suzumura and Xu (1999) call this “pure consequentialism”.

Before going to the case of several individuals let us examine one especially interesting argument put forward by Foster and Sen (1997), which makes the concern for capability almost a logical consequence of the concern for functioning. This stems from the realization that, at one level, the ‘ability to choose’ is, itself, a kind of functioning. Hence, a functioning vector \( x \) chosen from the opportunity set \( S \) and the functioning vector \( x \) chosen from the set \( T \) may be thought of as denoting different achievements in functioning (see Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 202). There is scope for some ambiguity here about what constitutes the functionings space. Though Foster and Sen are imprecise in stating this, the essential idea is formalizable and important. The first step in formalizing this is to recognize that the functioning representing the ability to choose is a very different kind of functioning from the other functionings that they talk about. Let us call these other functionings the \textit{basic} functionings and the functioning of choosing as a \textit{supervenient} functioning. When Foster and Sen begin by assuming that there are \( n \) different kinds of functionings and they use \( \mathbb{R}^n \) to represent the functionings space, clearly what they are talking about is basic functionings, because the interesting characteristic of the functioning of choosing (the supervenient functioning) is that it cannot be represented by real numbers because it is supervenient on the other functionings. Moreover, typically, one cannot choose between different levels of this functioning.\(^{21} \)
The supervenient functioning level presented to a person is represented by a subset of the other functionings—the subset from which the person is allowed to choose. In other words, in this more generalized space, a capability set is:

\[ \{ (x, K) : x \in K \} , \]

where \( K \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n \). When a person facing such a capability set chooses a point, for instance, \((x, K)\), the information about the capability that he faced is contained in his choice. Hence, an evaluation based on achieved (or chosen) functionings can be made sensitive to the capability set that the person faced. In this formulation, an evaluation based on capabilities alone is more restrictive than an evaluation based on the chosen functionings.

This formulation in terms of basic and supervenient functionings is a coherent one, as we tried to show above, and can be used for the actual evaluation of the quality of life of peoples; but we shall not pursue this line further. There are other problems to tackle concerning capabilities, even without going into this more sophisticated structure. So let us remain with the structure presented by Foster and Sen, where the functionings space is given by \( \mathbb{R}^n \), a capability set is a subset of \( \mathbb{R}^n \), and a chosen functioning vector is an element of the capability set.

There is, first of all, the question of ranking sets of functionings, to capture the idea of ‘greater capability’. That is, when can we say that one set represents a larger amount of capability or freedom than another set? This has been the subject of some inquiry (Kannai and Peleg, 1984; Barbera and Pattanaik, 1984; and Pattanaik and Xu, 1990) and it has had its share of impossibility theorems. But that takes us more into the domain of freedom. Staying closer to the concept of capability, we want to,
here, draw attention to a very different kind of controversy—an ambiguity in the concept of opportunity as defined in economics. To understand this, the contents of the sets are unimportant. It does not matter whether they consist of commodities or functionings or something else. So let us introduce the problem, as in Basu (1987a), by using the standard Walrasian general equilibrium as the benchmark.

Keeping the framework abstract (and therefore widely applicable) let us use $X$ to denote the universal set of alternatives. Assume $X$ is finite and has at least three elements. We shall say that $(x, A)$ is an extended alternative if $x \not\in A \subset X$. An extended alternative, such as $(x, A)$, denotes the action of choosing $x$ when the set $A$ of alternatives is available to choose from. The central idea that Suzumura and Xu (1999) introduce, formalizing the notion that human beings care not just about their final choice but also their freedoms, is to argue that human beings have preferences over extended alternatives. To formalize this, suppose $\Omega$ is the set of all possible extended alternatives. An individual’s extended preference, $R$, is defined as an ordering (that is, a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation) on $\Omega$. It will now be seen that imposing some mild-looking axioms on $R$ can lock us into taking a very structured view of ‘how’ capabilities enter human preferences.

We shall in particular consider three among the several axioms that Suzumura and Xu (1999) have discussed. Let us use $P$ and $I$ to denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of $R$.

**Axiom I (Independence):** For all $(x, A), (y, B) \not\in \Omega$ and $z \not\in A \cup B$, $(x, A) R (y, B)$ if and only if $(x, A \cup \{z\}) R (y, B \cup \{z\})$.

**Axiom S (Simple Independence):** For all distinct alternatives $x, y, z \not\in X$, $(x, \{x, y\}) I (x, \{x, z\})$. 


**Axiom M (Monotonicity):** For all $x \in X$, there exists $(x, A) \in \Omega$ such that $(x, X) \succ (x, A)$.

The interpretations of these axioms are straightforward. Axiom I says that if a person is indifferent between choosing $x$ from A and choosing $x$ from B, then if the capability set is expanded by adding another alternative ($z$), while keeping the choice the same, the person must continue to be indifferent over the new pair of extended alternatives. Axiom S says that when a person chooses from a pair of alternatives, as long as the chosen element is the same, the person must be indifferent. And finally, Axiom M asserts that for every alternative $x$, there exists a sufficiently small set $A \subseteq X$ such that a person prefers to choose $x$ from $X$ than $x$ from $A$. A special instance of this is the assertion $(x, X) \succ (x, \{x\})$, for all $x \in X$.

These three axioms together however turn out to be very restrictive as the following theorem, proved by Suzumura and Xu (1999), shows.

**Theorem:** If $R$ satisfies axioms I, S and M, then for all $(x, A), (x, B) \in \Omega$ $(x, A) \succ (x, B) \iff \# A \geq \# B$.

In other words, a person whose preference satisfies these three axioms is concerned about capability but his concern for capability takes a rather narrow ‘counting’ approach. The more alternatives he is able to reject, the better off he is.

Apart from the analytical elegance of the theorem, it is valuable in showing how the concern for
capability emerges easily from elementary notions regarding human preference. On the other hand it demonstrates how quickly we can get locked into a rather mechanistic view of preferences for freedom. To break out of this we can try to relax these axioms – several variants of these are discussed by Suzumura and Xu (1999) – but, more interestingly we can question the domain of this discourse. How reasonable is it to assume that the domain of human preference is $\Omega$?

Consider the case where a person prefers $z$ to $x$ and $x$ to $y$. Then the person is likely to view the feasible set \{x, y\} very differently from \{x, z\}. And Axiom S begins to look less plausible than it earlier did. Moreover, it is no longer clear how we should interpret the extended alternative (x, \{x, z\}) since the person will not ever choose $x$ when $x$ and $z$ are available. If by (x, \{x, z\}) we mean a situation where $x$ is forced on this person from \{x, z\}, then it is not clear that ‘choosing’ is the right word to describe this person’s achieving $x$. In light if this, one way to modify the Suzumura-Xu framework is to restrict their domain, based on the agent’s preference, $R$, on $X$.

Given $R$, let us define $\Omega (R)$ as the domain of all possible extended alternatives as follows: $(x, A) \in \Omega (R)$ if and only if $x \ 0 \ A \subset X$ and $x \ R \ y$, for all $y \ 0 \ A$. It will be interesting to explore the consequences of imposing reasonable axioms on the person’s extended ordering on this more restricted domain. But such an exercise that lies beyond the scope of this paper.

Let us now turn to the problem of interpersonal freedoms.

Let Figure 1 be a usual Edgeworth box of a 2-person, 2-good exchange economy. It depicts a general equilibrium. Let $w$ be the point representing initial endowment. They face prices depicted by the line AB. Given the indifference curves as shown equilibrium occurs at e. In this economy, person 1’s choice
or achievement is point e but his opportunity set or capability (the concept here being restricted to
the domain of commodities, rather than functionings) is CABO\textsubscript{1}. Likewise for person 2, whose
opportunity set is ABDO\textsubscript{2}.

[Insert figure 1 around here]

The question that we want to raise now is whether these individuals are “really” free to choose
any points within their opportunity sets. In an important sense the answer is no. This is because what is
actually open to one person depends on what the other person chooses. For instance, in Figure 1, it is
not possible for one person to choose point w and the other to choose d. Similarly, if 2 chooses point e,
1 cannot choose point d; 1’s belief (in the competitive model) that he can choose d is, in a sense,
illusory. Once 2 has chosen e, the only choices open to 1 are the points in the rectangle between e and
O\textsubscript{1}.

Given that opportunity sets have this element of illusion of choices, how much significance can
we attach to opportunity sets as expressions of opportunity or capability or advantage? Also, once this
problem is appreciated, it becomes clear that opportunities can be increased vastly without changing
anything of significance. Consider the closed set bounded by DfeECO\textsubscript{2}. From this remove all points on
the curve FeE, except e. Let us call the set that remains Z\textsubscript{2}. If instead of restricting 2’s opportunity set to
ABDO\textsubscript{2} we allow him to choose from the set Z\textsubscript{2}, the equilibrium would remain unchanged. If we were
evaluating this society in terms of opportunities open to individuals, this exercise of making 2’s
opportunity set \( Z_2 \) would make this society appear better, but clearly our evaluation of this society should not hinge on such ploys.

To understand the problem further note that the fact that agents 1 and 2 cannot simultaneously choose points \( d \) and \( e \) does not mean that they do not have the freedom to choose those points. The trouble stems from the fact that nor can you invariably say that they *have* the freedom to choose those points.

Consider a cocktail party for one hundred persons. At the venue of the party there are ten chairs, but most people show a preference for standing around, drinking and chatting; so that one chair remains vacant throughout. It seems reasonable to say that each person has the freedom to sit. This is so even though everybody cannot exercise this freedom. Next think of a train compartment with 10 seats for which hundred passengers have been sold tickets. These are polite people and so one seat remains vacant throughout the journey, no one wanting to appear impolite and grabbing the last seat. Here it would be wrong to say that everybody has the freedom to sit, even though at a purely behavioral level the situations (the party and the train) are the same. If there were no seats or chairs, we could unequivocally assert that people did not have the freedom or opportunity to sit; if there were hundred seats, we could say equally firmly that everybody had the opportunity to sit. What is interesting about the intermediate case, as illustrated by the above examples, is that freedom or capability has more to it than pure physical availability. One person’s freedom can depend on another person’s preference. At the party no one wanted to take that seat whereas in the train there were many who would have liked to have taken that last seat. That is what changes the fact that, while at the party each person has the
freedom to sit, in the train that is not the case.

It should be emphasized that this is not an argument that dismisses the importance of freedom nor one that claims that individuals in a Walrasian economy face no freedom. It simply shows that the extent of freedom faced by an individual in such an economy is a philosophically contested matter; that the traditional textbook view of equating this with the opportunity set may be too simplistic. Interestingly, this problem does not arise in a game-theoretic characterization of an economy or a game-form depiction of the choice problem faced by individuals (see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993; Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura, 1992; Deb, 1994), because in a game, as opposed to a market economy or a pseudo game, an individual’s set of opportunities or strategy set is independent of other people’s choices.

This problem makes capabilities much harder to use in the actual evaluation of social states or societies; and so may mean that for the time being one is forced to use achieved functionings as the basis for evaluating societies. This is the line taken by Brandolini and D’Alessio (1998), the approach taken by the Swedish approach to social welfare (Erikson, 1993), and also the basis of the human development index of the UNDP, as discussed below.

6. Applications of the Capabilities Approach to Poverty Measurement and Gender Issues

Several applications of the capabilities approach to well-being have been used in the literature. One application is related to the concept of poverty, seen as “capability deprivation” (Sen 1983a,
Poverty can be seen as being relative in the dimension of income, but absolute in the realm of capabilities (Sen, 1983a).

The idea that poverty is not completely understood just by looking at income data is not new. Rowntree in 1901 wrote the book *Poverty: A Study in Town Life*, already calling for a distinction between “primary” and “secondary” poverty. Only the former was defined in terms of inadequacy of income, incorporating in the latter aspects such as influences that affect the family’s consumption behavior. Rowntree’s book also highlighted the need for defining several poverty lines because of variations in persons’ characteristics.\(^{22}\)

In the late seventies, new research tried to incorporate the ‘fact' that poverty has a multidimensional nature (Townsend, 1979), though this was done without making use of the capabilities approach. One example of this is the so-called “Scandinavian Approach to Welfare Research” (Erikson and Uusitalo, 1987; Erikson, 1993). This multidimensional approach to poverty measurement has been formalized by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (1998) and there are also papers which combine the capabilities approach to poverty with the multidimensional approach.\(^{23}\)

The closest empirical approach to the idea of capabilities in poverty assessment, the “Scandinavian” approach, started with research centered around the Swedish Level of Living Surveys from 1968-81. The Swedish multidimensional approach included nine groups of indicators of standard of living, namely health and access to health care, employment and working conditions, economic resources, education and skills, family and social integration, housing, security of life and property, recreation and culture, and political resources. Each component included several indicators.\(^{24}\) Though
this approach is akin to the capabilities approach, criticisms have been made, that in measuring certain indicators of well-being the approach is not clear as to what exactly it is that is being measured. For example, “housing” is measured by people having access to a dwelling, whereas from a conceptual perspective the concept of “homelessness” is broader than the idea of not “having access to a shelter” (Brandolini and D’Alessio, 1998; Foster and Sen, 1997). The Scandinavian approach established, however, a broad framework for an empirical application of the capabilities approach, for a certain set of functionings.

Why is it necessary to introduce this new concept instead of the existing income-based poverty assessment? According to Sen (1998), there are three reasons for this: i) income is only instrumentally important, whereas poverty can be sensibly characterized in terms of capability deprivation; ii) there are influences on capability deprivation—on poverty—that are different from lowness of income; and, iii) the instrumental relation between low income and low capability varies across communities and even across families and individuals.

The second point has to do with the capacity of individuals to convert income into functionings, introducing the aspects of disability, discussed in Sen’s original formulation of the capabilities approach. Establishing poverty lines in terms of income implicitly assumes equal capacity of conversion, which may not be necessarily true. The third point, that of the variability of the relation between income and functionings across communities, families, and individuals, allows us to deal with issues like gender discrimination in intra-household allocation of resources. From the new perspective it is possible to identify instances of “functioning-poverty” even in relatively affluent societies and for levels of income.
that would not be regarded as being below an income-based poverty line.\textsuperscript{26} Empirical work carried out by Ruggeri (1997, 1999) has shown that the identification of poverty may differ once the multidimensional approach is used instead of the common monetary poverty lines.\textsuperscript{27} A similar conclusion is reached by Klasen (2000), using data for South Africa. Finally, another interesting application uses data for the unemployed population in Belgium to show that income is a poor indicator of capability deprivation for Belgian men (Schokkaert and Van Ooteghem, 1990).

The Human Development Reports, published by the United Nations, have applied these principles to the measurement of human development from the perspective of gender equality. This resulted in the "gender-related development index", which corrects the Human Development Index for disparity of achievement between women and men (UNDP, 1997). Razavi (1996) is another example in which the concept is used for the analysis of gender discrimination using village-level data from Iran.\textsuperscript{28}

Besides the use of the capabilities approach in the analysis of well-being, inequality, poverty and the standard of living, as well as gender issues, there are other applications in the literature. These include: political participation (Bohman, 1997), freedom (Carter, 1996; Baveta, 1996; Sen, 1998), and project evaluation and environmental issues (Casini and Bernetti, 1996).

7. Capability and Exclusion

The link between capability and poverty, as discussed above, is an important one. Access to the market is a form of capability which can enable a person to escape abject poverty. Yet in poor
countries many people do not have access to markets, which all of us seem to take for granted. This is more than a matter of possessing enough money. It has to do with the structure of markets and the nature of industrial organization. Atkinson (1995) has explored this link between capability and market exclusion. In his own words, what he was trying was to explore “the link between a specified capability and the distribution of income in the society, by introducing an aspect not typically considered: the conditions under which goods are supplied” (Atkinson, 1995, p.18). His model is based on Sen’s (1983a, p. 161) view: “At the risk of over-simplification, I would like to say that poverty is an absolute notion in the space of capabilities but very often it will take a relative form in the space of commodities or characteristics.”

To understand the core idea behind Atkinson’s model assume that we have an economy in which there are n workers and the productivity of the workers vary, uniformly, from $w_1$ to $w_2$, where $w_1 > w_2$. The ‘productivity’ of a worker defined in terms of what the worker can produce in this village. In other words, the least productive worker will produce $w_1$ units of output, when employed by a firm in this village, and the most productive worker will produce $w_2$ units when employed by a firm in this village. And the number of workers who have productivity in the interval $[m_1, m_2]$, where $[m_1, m_2] \subset [w_1, w_2]$, is given by $(m_2 - m_1)n/(w_2 - w_1)$.

We shall now consider the market for bicycles. A bicycle is a commodity but one which can enable a person to achieve functionings otherwise not available, as in de Sica’s classic film, Bicycle Thief. It can, for instance, enable him to ride to a neighboring village, where there is more capital and so one can earn more than in this village. Let us now following Sen, allow for the fact that what a bicycle
can achieve for a person depends on who the person happens to be. Let us in particular assume that for a person with productivity \( m \in [w, w] \), the availability of a cycle enhances what he can produce by him. In other words, what he can earn with a cycle is \((1+h)m\) (by going to the neighboring village for work).

To see how some individuals may be excluded from the market, we have to now turn to the organization of the bicycle industry. Note that, if the price of a cycle is \( p \), only those individuals will buy cycles, whose productivity, \( m \), is such that \( hm \geq p \).

Let \( c \) be the cost of manufacturing a cycle. If \( hw < c \), then from the society’s point of view it is inefficient to provide everybody with a cycle. To rule this obvious kind of exclusion out, we shall henceforth assume that \( hw > c \). In other words, it is inefficient to exclude anybody from having a cycle. We shall now show how, if the market is allowed to function without intervention, some individuals, in particular, the most handicapped, will get excluded from the market.

The case of perfect competition in the bicycle market is easily dealt with, and is a useful benchmark. By perfect competition, if we mean price taking behavior and free entry of firms to the industry, then it is clear that the price of each cycle will drop to \( c \) and all \( n \) individuals will get to own a cycle.

The interesting cases arise, when the industry is not fully competitive. For reasons of brevity, let us confine our attention to the case of pure monopoly, where the monopolist has to set one price for all buyers (that is, there is no price discrimination). If the monopolist sets price equal to \( p \), his profit, \( \pi \), will clearly be given as follows:
\[ \pi = \{(w - (p/h))/(w - w)\}n(p - c). \]

From the first-order condition, it is evident that the monopolist will set the price at \( p^* \), such that:

\[ p^* = (hw + c)/2. \]

This means that all individuals with productivity below \( p^*/h \) is excluded from the cycle market. It is not in the interest of the monopolist to sell to individuals who are relatively less productive and, therefore, relatively poor. The number of persons thus excluded is given by \( e^* \), where

\[ e^* = n[\{(hw + c)/2h\} - w]/(w - w). \]

It may be checked that, since \( c > hw \), hence \( e^* > 0 \). Hence, a positive number of individuals will be excluded even though each person values a cycle more than the cost of producing a cycle.

From the definition of \( p^* \) above it follows that all individuals with productivity less than \( w^* \), will be excluded from the cycle market, where \( w^* \) is given by:

\[ w^* = (hw + c)/2h \]

It is now easy to see that a person’s capability can alter even without any change that is internal to her, purely by virtue of changes in other people’s income, or the income distribution or by the arrival of immigrants, or by the out-migration of people. Just to take an example, suppose that the distribution of income worsens in this society, so that the richest person becomes richer, that is, \( w \) becomes higher. This will cause \( w^* \) to rise; so that a longer tail of low productivity persons are now denied access to a cycle. Likewise, if a group of wealthy migrants (productivity above \( w \)) come into this economy, then a larger number of poor persons will be excluded from the market. In the language of famines, the entitlements of poor individuals may diminish, without any change in the productive capacity of the
economy or any innate change in the poor people. This also illustrates the possibility of an entitlement-based famine (Sen, 1981), without any diminution, not just in production but in productive capacity.

Atkinson has taken this model further, and it is in fact possible to treat this as a base model to raise a variety of questions concerning poverty and famines caused by what appears to be unrelated factors, such as changes in the market structure and alterations in income distribution at the upper end of the income distribution, which seemingly leave the poor unaffected. But in the present context, the model is best viewed as one which brings “together the notion of poverty, in terms of an incapacity to function arising from the inability to purchase goods essential to that functioning, and the treatment of price and quality decisions in the industrial organization literature” (Atkinson, 1995, p. 29).

8. The Human Development Index

One important practical consequence of the capabilities approach is the emergence of the human development index (HDI), which is computed and made available annually in the Human Development Reports of the UNDP. There is now a substantial literature, using, criticizing, and advancing further these indices, and the HDI has become part of the popular basis for criticizing or praising societies.

The HDI is a method of ranking economies based on three summary measures of functioning. The three measures pertain to life expectancy or the basic functioning of living, literacy or the ability to read, write and communicate better and, finally, the economic standard of living or the ability to buy
goods and services that one desires.

To understand this more formally, let an average person’s life expectancy at birth (in a certain nation) be given by \( l \). Next let us turn to education. A nation’s educational achievement is calculated by the Human Development Report 1998 as follows. First the nation’s adult literacy rate is measured, then the nation’s school enrolment ratio is measured and then a weighted average of these two is calculated with a weight of 2/3rd on literacy and 1/3 on enrolment. Let us denote the nation’s educational achievement level, thus calculated, by \( e \). Finally, a nation’s economic standard of living is measured by taking its ‘adjusted’ per capita income. The adjustment is of the following kind. First the nation’s per capita income with purchasing power parity correction is estimated. Then for incomes above a certain level the adjusted income is treated as one discounted by Atkinson’s formula for the utility of income (see UNDP, 1998, p.107). Let a country’s adjusted per capita income be given by \( y \).

Now, for each of these three indices, \( l, e \) and \( y \), levels are chosen for the maximum and the minimum that a nation can have. Let us denoted these by, respectively, \( L, E, \) and \( Y, \) and \( \lambda, \varepsilon \) and \( \xi \). These are of course somewhat arbitrary. Thus, for instance, the maximum possible life expectancy at birth is treated as 85 years and the minimum as 25 years. Once these estimations and choice of benchmarks have been made, the HDI is easy to derive. The country’s HDI, denoted by \( H \), is given follows.

\[
H = \frac{l - \lambda}{L - \lambda} + \frac{e - \varepsilon}{E - \varepsilon} + \frac{y - \xi}{Y - \xi}
\]

Table 1, below, takes a sample of ten nations and gives their HDIs and GDP per capita. It is
evident from column 3 that the ranks depend importantly on whether we use human development or GDP to evaluate a nation’s well-being.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>Real GDP per capita (US$, PPP)</th>
<th>HDI rank minus GDP rank&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.960</td>
<td>21,459</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>26,397</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>21,581</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>5,919</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>7,384</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>21,875</td>
<td>-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>3,277</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td>2,604</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>9,338</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>3,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> A positive number means that the HDI ranking is higher than the GDP ranking for that country.

<sup>b</sup> Preliminary update of the Penn World Tables using an expanded set of international comparisons.

Source: UNDP, 1997, Table 1.

Canada has a lower per capita income than the US but a higher HDI--in fact, Canada has the world’s highest HDI. Of all the countries reported in Table 1 Kuwait has the second highest per capita
income, but it comes way down when it comes to human development. It is pulled down mainly by its low educational achievement. In the case of countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the GDP per capita is a poor indicator of the level of development, as evaluated from a broader perspective that is consistent with the capabilities approach. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia go down 47 and 32 places in their ranking in the world, respectively, when the HDI criterion is used.

Other countries, however, rank better from the HDI perspective than they would if one were to consider only their GDP per capita. This is the case of Costa Rica and Cuba that go up by 27 and 17 places, respectively, under the HDI perspective. In other cases, like Japan and Mexico, the criterion does not seem to matter much for the comparison year. It is worth mentioning here that the GDP criterion is also less stable and can be affected by exchange rate disruptions and macroeconomic crisis, whereas the HDI rank is more robust to those short run fluctuations.

One criticism of the HDI voiced often enough is that aggregating over literacy, life expectancy, and income is like adding apples and oranges. While such aggregation does hide information and is justifiably a source of concern, we must not go overboard in resisting aggregation. For one, there are contexts where we do add apples and oranges. We would do so, for instance, if someone asked us how many fruits there are in a basket which contains apples, oranges, and plums. Secondly, the concept of national income, used so ubiquitously, is itself highly aggregative. Whether a particular aggregation is right or wrong depends on the question that we are trying to answer. There is nothing fundamentally right or wrong in adding different entities together. Once people get to understand intuitively what as measure means, they are willing to accept it. A problem with the HDI is that its aggregation is not simple
enough. Perhaps the best way to use the index is in conjunction with the disaggregated data on each country. Thus we could view a country's well-being as represented by a vector. What is interesting about the HDI is not the exact measure but its emphasis on multi-dimensional, functionings-based view of development. That there was a need for this is evident from the rapidity with which it has caught on. The World Bank's recent move to adopt a "comprehensive development framework" is also a move in a similar direction.

8. Concluding Remarks

The capabilities approach opened an alternative route to welfare economics, traditionally focused on the analysis of well-being from the point of view of command over goods and services. In this new approach, commodities and utility are replaced by functionings and capability. Goods are only relevant in the sense that they allow people to achieve different "doings" or "beings", called functionings. The set of functionings available to a person represents her capability set.

The idea that goods allow people to "function" in a human way and to interact socially goes back to Aristotle, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. Moreover, the principle that real freedom does not depend on what people are "prevented from doing" by the law, but what people are indeed able to do in a "positive sense" has been taken from Karl Marx, T. H. Green, and Isaiah Berlin. Amartya Sen proposed the new approach in his Tanner lectures at Stanford University in 1979. After early attempts by Sen himself, several alternative formalizations have been proposed.
Applications of the functionings and capabilities approach have been attempted in the contexts of poverty measurement, gender issues, political freedom, and standard of living assessment. The most important attempt to make the approach operational was the creation of the Human Development Reports by the United Nations and the construction of the Human Development Index (HDI). The way countries rank in terms of development when measured by the HDI tends to differ, in some cases widely so, from those rankings based solely on income per capita.

Capability is closely related to the idea of opportunity or advantage. Ideally, in order to fully evaluate a person's well-being from this perspective, we would need to know the set of functionings from which he was indeed able to choose freely --the capability set--, as well as a singleton: the functionings that were achieved. The problem of measuring "opportunity" can, however, be problematic from a philosophical perspective, especially when a person's opportunity depends on other people's choices. It is evident therefore that, for some time to come, the attempts at applying the capabilities approach will run hand in hand with research to give greater rigor to its theoretical foundations.

It is however worth keeping in mind that the capabilities approach may well turn out to be (as with some other larger ideas in moral philosophy and social analysis, such as liberty or utility) not amenable to a single over-arching formalization. We may have to contend with alternative specific formalizations and algorithms for dealing with different aspects of it. This may be viewed as a criticism of this approach. But it may also be its strength.


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Figure 1

Edgeworth Box and Strategic Interaction
NOTES

1 Nussbaum (1988) says that “...Aristotle’s statement of the [proposed] view is full of internal obscurity and inconsistency; and sorting our way through all of this will take us at times away from a straightforward investigation of the view” (p. 145). Discussion and criticisms of Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle can be found in Crocker (1995) and Des Gasper (1997b).

2 The concept of the “good life”, the one in which you reach the state of happiness as the final end, is related to the Greek words eudaimonia (good state, sense of peace and happiness) and makarios (being pure, free of sins, being happy). Nussbaum argues in different writings that Aristotle used these two words interchangeably to refer to a “flourishing life” or a “good life”. On the other hand, the Greek word dunamin, used by Aristotle in his discussion of the human good, can be translated as “capability of existing or acting”, though it has been sometimes translated as “potentiality”. See Sen (1993).

3 Nicomachean Ethics, I.5. Also, “Choosing a life of dumb grazing animals”, in a different translation (Nussbaum, 1988).

4 “The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforementioned objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been wasted on the support of them” (Nicomachean Ethics, I.6).

5 The idea of the ability to participate in the political life has been discussed in Bohman (1997) and Sen (1998).


7 The original publication of the essay “Two concepts of liberty” took place in 1958. Sen discusses this perspective in, for example, Sen (1989).

8 The classical reference on the utilitarian perspective is Bentham (1789). For the axiomatic foundations of utilitarianism, see D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), Maskin (1978), Roberts (1980), and Basu (1983).

9 For the axiomatic foundations of this principle see Hammond (1976), Strasnick (1976), and D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977).

10 He has elaborated on his original theory in Rawls (1975, 1982, 1985).

11 There is of course some ambiguity in this because it is not always obvious how one compares between bundles. This is addressed later through the work by Herrero (1996).
While for Sen utility is a sense of pleasure or happiness.


The idea of the "veil of ignorance" comes originally from Adam Smith. See Harsanyi (1982).

Instead of assuming infinite risk-aversion of the agents, Roemer suggests that we consider choice under ignorance, as in Maskin (1979), in which the choice of an alternative that maximizes the minimum possible utility is advocated, in a framework in which agents do not know the probability distributions over goods and states. Maskin (1978) actually refers to his work (published later as Maskin (1979)) saying that, if the framework of decision making under ignorance is considered, the utilitarian rule is an “immediate consequence”.

Kolm (1972) developed an egalitarian theory similar to Rawls’ independently, almost simultaneously. Kolm also emphasizes the existence of a basic set of goods as an index to evaluate equality. He claims that “Fundamentally, all individuals have the same needs, the same tastes, and the same desires” (Kolm, 1972, p. 79). In that sense, he is consistent with Rawls in the sense that there exists a basic set of goods whose provision guarantees equality of opportunity across individuals. Individuals that seem to be different are so because of some specific feature that can be added to the commodity space, as long as it is needed for individuals to look the same. Once that reductionist process takes place we arrive at the level of some “fundamental preferences”, under which all individuals are the same.

The function does not have to be necessarily linear.

Commodities can be divided into a set that is relevant for the "basic" functioning, and those that are only valued by specific individuals, called "personal" commodities, or "primary" and "secondary" resources, as in Roemer (1996).

This is, of course, a rather straightforward assumption. But it is worth keeping in mind that this assumption is compatible with \( c(x_i) = c(y_i) \) and \( u_i(x_i) > u_i(y_i) \).

On this, see Chiappero-Martinetti (1994, 1996) and Sen's comments on that work (Sen, 1994). For previous work on the application of fuzzy set theory to the measurement of inequality see Basu (1987b).

The reason why this need not always be so is that individuals can at times choose the set from which they choose. Schelling (1985) and Akerlof (1991), in particular, have written about how individuals do at times take actions to restrict the set from which they choose. People, often set rules for themselves which they then treat as constraints: I will not smoke more that 10 cigarettes a day or, if I drink more than one peg I will not drive. Alternatively, they often make choices which restrict their own future options, such as the person who does not carry his cigarette pack with him or the woman who throws away the pain-killer before the labor pain begins. Basu (2000) shows that such behavior may be fully compatible with individual rationality.

An example of empirical evaluation of well-being explicitly from the functionings perspective is Brandolini and D'Alessio (1998). An attempt to construct poverty indices from the capabilities perspective taking into account implementation issues is Desai (1990). See also Balestrino (1992, 1994). A theoretical discussion of the applicability of the framework can be found in Alkire and Black (1997), and an extensive discussion of the foundations and the usefulness of the approach is in Alkire (2000).

For example, for “health and access to health care”, the survey would typically include indicators such as ability to walk 100 meters, symptoms of illness, and contacts with doctors and nurses (Erikson, 1993).


An interesting case study is Balestrino (1996), based on a report requested by the Bishop of Pistoia, Italy about Poverty in that region.

These applications use data for Chile (Ruggeri, 1997) and Peru (Ruggeri, 1999).

For a discussion on the application of the capabilities approach to gender justice and women's capabilities, see Nussbaum (1995a, 1995b), and chapter 1, “Women and Cultural Universals” in Nussbaum (1999).
