

ORGANIZACIÓN INDUSTRIAL

Profesor: Alejandro Castañeda Sabido

Organización industrial tiene como objeto analizar el tema de competencia entre pocas firmas tanto en el corto como en el largo plazo. El objetivo del curso es empapar al estudiante de los diferentes modelos que han tratado de estudiar estos temas.

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